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Abstract
If the military force of an international organization is made the object of a military attack 
by a State, that international organization may be regarded as being entitled to use force in 
self-defence. However, since the forces of international organizations are generally composed 
of national contingents which States put at the disposal of the international organizations, the 
question may be raised as to whether, in case of an armed attack against such forces, the sending 
State would also be entitled to use force in self-defence to protect its national contingent. This 
question, which was addressed, albeit in a very cursory manner, in the 2009 Report of the EU 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, has to be answered 
taking into account the status of national contingents as organs of the sending States. By attaching 
relevance to the contingent’s dual status and to the rationale underlying the rule on self-defence, 
this study argues that whenever the national contingent is made the object of an armed attack 
the possibility for the sending State to invoke self-defence cannot be excluded. In particular, the 
invocability of self-defence by the sending State should be admitted in those cases in which the 
armed attack is clearly aimed at targeting that State.
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1. Introduction
The use of force in self-defence by an international organization still remains, 
to a large extent, an abstract subject. Practice is rare. The fact that such 
practice mainly concerns the activities of United Nations peacekeeping 
forces seems to further complicate matters: given the special role and 
functions of the United Nations, and the difficulties sometimes to identify 
a clear dividing line between use of force in self-defence and use of force 
for collective security purposes, the practice of the United Nations in this 
respect may not always lend itself to an easy generalization.
Despite the lack of clear indications from practice, there is wide support in 
international legal literature to the idea that international organizations which 
are victims of an armed attack are entitled to use force in self-defence.1 This 
view is generally based on the argument that, if international organizations 
find themselves to be confronted with situations of armed attack comparable 
1) Finn Seyersted, “United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems”, 37 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1961), p. 472; Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, “Claims Against International 
Organizations: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”, 7 The Yale Journal of World Public Order 
(1981), p. 176; Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein, “Action humanitaire et Chapitre VII: La 
redéfinition du mandat et des moyens d’action des forces des Nations Unies”, 39 Annuaire 
français de droit international (1993), p. 122; Pierre Klein, La Responsabilité des Organisations 
Internationales (Bruylant, Brussels, 1998), p. 419 et seq.; Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in 
UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), p. 15; Christian Dominicé, 
“La responsabilité internationale des Nations Unies”, in Jean-Pierre Cot et al (eds.), La 
Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire article par article (Economica, Paris, 3rd ed., 2005), 
p. 158; Emmanuel Roucounas, “Present Problems of the Use of Force in International 
Law: Sub-group on Self-defence: Provisional Draft”, 72-I Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit 
International (2007), p. 127. The resolution on “Present problems of the use of force in 
international law: A. Self-defence”, adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 2007 
at the session of Santiago, does not address the question of the invocability of self-defence 
by an international organization; it simply observes that the problem “of the relationship 
between self-defence and international organizations” required “further study from the 
Institute” (the text of the resolution is available at <www.idi-iil.org>). It must be observed 
that, particularly with regard to the use of force by United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
the notion of self-defence is often used to refer to the personal right belonging to peacekeep-
ers to defend themselves against attacks; it also includes the ‘defence of the mandate’. This 
notion of self-defence must be kept distinct from the right of self-defence belonging to a 
State or to an international organization in case of armed attack by another State. On this 
distinction see Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales, supra, p. 421. In the 
present article the notion of self-defence is used to refer to the military response by a State 
or an international organization against an armed attack. 
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to those which justify a reaction in self-defence by a State, then there is no 
reason to deny them the possibility to resort to force to repel the attack.2 
Most recently, the invocability of self-defence by international organizations 
has been acknowledged by the International Law Commission. Article 20 
of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 
adopted on first reading in 2009, provides that “[t]he wrongfulness of an act 
of an international organization is precluded if and to the extent that that 
act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence under international law”.3 
Interestingly, in their comments to the Commission’s work, States did not 
manifest opposition against this provision. While several States observed 
that the right of self-defence possessed by international organizations may 
not have the same scope as the right of self-defence possessed by States, 
the majority of opinions expressed on this subject appeared to accept the 
idea that, under certain circumstances, international organizations may be 
considered to be entitled to resort to force in self-defence.4
Situations which may conceivably amount to an armed attack against 
an international organization are restricted to a few cases. Leaving aside the 
case of an international organization administering a territory, the most 
likely, if not the only, situation is when the armed force of an international 
organization is made the object of a military attack by a State.5 As is well 
known, Article 3(d) of General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the 
2) See, e.g., Giorgio Gaja, Fourth Report on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 
A/CN.4/564, p. 5.
3) Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-first Session, A/64/10, p. 95. The text 
adopted in 2009 slightly differs from the text previously adopted by the International Law 
Commission in 2006, which provided that “[t]he wrongfulness of an act of an international 
organization is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in 
conformity with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations”. See Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session, A/61/10, p. 
265.
4) For a summary of the positions held by States in their comments to Article 18 of the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, see Giorgio Gaja, Seventh 
Report on the Responsibility of the International Organizations, A/CN.4/610, pp. 20–21.
5) For the view that “ce type de situation recouvre en fait l’essentiel des hypothèses dans 
lesquelles la force est utilisée à l’encontre d’organisations internationals”, see Klein, supra 
note 1, p. 420. The view that the United Nations would be entitled to invoke self-defence 
in the case in which an armed attack takes place against a territory administered by them is 
held by Dominicé, supra note 1, p. 158. See also Gaja, supra note 4, p. 21. 
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“Definition of Aggression” provides that an attack by the armed forces of 
a State on the land, sea, or air forces of another State qualifies as an act of 
aggression. Resolution 3314 (XXIX) only refers to attacks against the armed 
force of a State; however, it is reasonable to assume that the same act should 
equally be qualified as aggression even if it was directed against the armed 
force of an international organization.
While an international organization can lawfully take military measures to 
defend its armed force against the attack of a State, it may be asked whether 
in such a situation the organization is also the only subject entitled to invoke 
self-defence. Armed forces of international organizations usually have a 
complex legal status. The invocability of self-defence by an international 
organization is premised on the fact that the armed force is an organ of that 
organization and, when attacked, was performing the functions assigned 
to it by the organization. However, these forces are generally composed of 
national contingents which States put at the disposal of the international 
organizations. Even if national contingents are placed under the operational 
command of an organ of the organization, as in the case of United Nations 
peacekeeping forces, they remain in their national service and the sending 
States retain significant powers over their troops. Because of the permanence 
of these links between a national contingent and the sending State, one 
may wonder whether a State, when contributing troops to the armed force 
of an international organization, retains the right to exercise some form of 
protection in respect to these troops and in particular whether this protec-
tion also includes the right of self-defence when the national contingent is 
subject to an armed attack by another State. 
The question of whether a State may use force to protect a national 
contingent forming part of a peacekeeping mission under international 
mandate has been recently addressed in the Report released on September 
2009 by the EU Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia.6 While the situation addressed by the EU Fact-Finding 
Mission did not concern a national contingent put at the disposal of an 
international organization, the Report also contains some interesting, albeit 
cursory, considerations regarding this type of situations. An assessment of 
6) The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia was 
established by the European Union Council with its decision 2008/901/CFSP of 2 December 
2008. The Report of the Fact-Finding mission is available at <www.ceiig.ch>.
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the approach followed by the EU Mission may therefore provide a useful 
starting point for the analysis of the question raised above.
The invocability of self-defence by troop-contributing States in case of 
armed attack against the forces of an international organization will be 
examined here, having in mind armed forces presenting the complex legal 
status as briefly referred to above. In this respect, United Nations peacekeep-
ing forces represent a model of this type of forces, though the present study 
does not purport to examine specifically the legal regime governing the 
activity of United Nations forces. When the armed force of an international 
organization is composed of individuals having exclusively the status of 
organs or agents of that organization, as in the case when members of the 
force are enlisted individually by the organization, there seems to be little 
doubt that only the organization may be entitled to act in self-defence.7 
Conversely, when the national contingent is not put at the disposal of the 
organization and remains under the command and control of its State, that 
contingent exclusively acts as an organ of the contributing State. This State 
will therefore be the only subject entitled to invoke self-defence in case of 
armed attack. This is irrespective of whether the State, when deploying 
its armed forces, has relied on a recommendation or authorization of an 
international organization, or not.8
7) Seyersted, supra nota 1, p. 405.
8) The fact that an organ of a State took certain conduct in reliance on the recommendation 
or authorization of an organization does not imply that that conduct is to be attributed to 
the organization or that the organization is entitled to act externally as bearer of rights in 
respect to this organ. With regard to the question of attribution of internationally wrongful 
acts, this view has been clearly upheld by the International Law Commission. See Report 
of the International Law Commission, supra note 3, p. 57. For a different view see, however, 
the decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 2 May 2007 in the cases Behrami 
& Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway (text available at <www.
echr.coe.int>), where the Court found that conduct of military forces of States acting under 
authorization of the Security Council was to be attributed exclusively to the United Nations. 
If one accepts the European Court’s view that the United Nations is the only subject which 
bears responsibility for acts of the military forces of States acting under authorization of 
the Security Council, it seems that the invocability of self-defence by the sending States 
in case of armed attacks against national contingents should be denied. For some critical 
remarks concerning the criterion of attribution applied by the European Court, see Report 
of the International Law Commission, Sixty-first Session, supra note 3, p. 67. See also Pierre 
Klein, “Responsabilité pour les faits commis dans le cadre d’opérations de paix et étendue du 
pouvoir de contrôle de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme: quelques considerations 
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2. The Use of Force against Russian Peacekeepers in Georgia: The 
Assessment of the eU Fact-Finding Mission
Among the many issues addressed in the 2009 Report of the EU Fact-Finding 
Mission in Georgia, one concerned the legal qualification of the use of force 
by Russia against Georgia in August 2008. In a letter of 11 August 2008, 
Russia had informed the Security Council that its armed intervention in the 
territory of Georgia was justified as an action in self-defence under Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter. According to Russia that intervention 
pursued “no other goal but to protect the Russian peacekeeping contingent 
and citizens of the Russian Federation … and to prevent future armed attacks 
against them”.9 The peacekeeping contingent referred to in the letter was 
a Russian military unity forming part of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces for 
South Ossetia, which had been established under an agreement concluded 
in 1992 in Sochi between Georgia and Russia. The Joint Peacekeeping 
Forces consisted of unities coming from the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian 
sides.10 Russia claimed that on 8 August 2008 Georgian troops attacked 
the peacekeepers’ military premises in South Ossetia and that such attack 
constituted an armed attack under Article 51 of the Charter.
The EU Fact-Finding Mission recognized that a military intervention 
against the land forces of a State stationing on the territory of another 
State may constitute an armed attack which is apt to trigger the right of 
self-defence of the sending State.11 The EU Mission even conceded that, 
critiques sur l’arrêt Behrami et Saramati”, 53 Annuaire français de droit international (2007), 
p. 55; Paolo Palchetti, “Azioni di forze istituite o autorizzate dalle Nazioni Unite davanti 
alla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo: i casi Beharami e Saramati” 90 Rivista Di Diritto 
Internazionale (2007), pp. 689–690; Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, “Entre multilatéralisme et 
unilatéralisme: l’autorisation par le Conseil de securité de recourir à la force” 9 Recueil des 
cours (2008), pp. 376 et seq.; Aurel Sari, “Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in 
Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases”, 8 Human Rights Law Review 
(2008), p. 164.
9) Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, 11 August 2008, UN Doc. S/2008/545.
10) For a description of the functioning of the Joint Peacekeeping Force, see Report of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, vol. I, p. 14, para. 
6, <www.ceiig.ch>.
11) Report, supra note 10, vol. II, p. 265. The EU Mission referred to Article 3(d) of the 
General Assembly Resolution “Definition of Aggression” (Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974) 
in order to qualify the assault against Russian peacekeepers as an armed attack. 
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“[i]f the Russian allegations were true, the attack by Georgian armed forces 
on the Russian military base would surpass the minimum threshold in 
scale of effects required for an ‘armed attack’ in the sense of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter”.12 In the end, however, it found that the Russian military 
intervention was unlawful as it did not comply with the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality. In the view of the EU Mission, “[a]s an act 
of self-defence against the attack on the Russian military bases, the only 
admissible objective of the Russian reaction was to eliminate the Georgian 
threat for its own peacekeepers”.13
For the purposes of the present study, the most interesting issue addressed 
in the Report was whether an armed attack directed against Russian troops 
forming part of a peacekeeping force provided under the Sochi Agreement 
could be considered as an armed attack triggering Russia’s right of self-
defence. In this regard, the EU Mission’s finding that “the Georgian attacks 
against the Russian peacekeepers’ base would equal an attack on an ordinary 
Russian base in foreign territory”14 was mainly based on the assessment 
of the degree of authority and control exercised by Russia over the troops 
forming part of this peacekeeping operation. In particular, the EU Mission 
first took care to stress that “[t]he peace-keeping operation here was not a 
UN organ that acted under the overall control of the United Nations”.15 
To substantiate this observation, relevance was given to the fact that Russia 
maintained “the ultimate military command” over its troops and that under 
the Sochi Agreement the Commander of the Joint Forces, who had the 
power to coordinate the activity of the different military units involved in 
the peacekeeping mission, was always to be from the Russian side. Having 
considered all these elements, the EU Mission concluded by noting that 
“[t]he entire legal arrangement suggests that actions of the peacekeeping 
forces were attributable to their respective states, and that the peacekeeping 
forces in that respect resembled ‘state instrumentalities’ which may legally 
be the object of an armed attack”.16
12) Ibid., p. 269.
13) Ibid., p. 274.
14) Ibid., p. 268.
15) Ibid., p. 267.
16) Ibid., p. 268.
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The latter assertion is somewhat strange because it gives the impression 
that attribution of the acts of a national contingent to its State is the decisive 
element to determine whether such contingent may be considered as a ‘State 
instrumentality’ for the purposes of self-defence. In fact, what matters for 
that purpose is whether the contingent was acting as an organ of its State. 
Attribution of the conduct of these forces to the State is simply a consequence 
of their status as organs of the State. Anyway, it is difficult not to agree with 
the conclusions reached by the EU Mission regarding the status of Russian 
peacekeepers. Taking into account the institutional arrangements governing 
the activity of these forces, there is little doubt that they were not placed at 
the disposal of another State or another organization and acted exclusively 
as organs of Russia. Under such circumstances, as we have seen, Russia 
appeared to be entitled, at least in principle, to act in self-defence in case 
of an armed attack by another State against these troops.
The Report’s appraisal of the situation characterizing United Na-
tions peacekeeping forces appears more debatable. By contrasting the 
peacekeeping operation under the Sochi Agreement with United Nations 
peacekeeping operations, the Report impliedly suggests that in the latter 
case national contingents cannot be considered as ‘State instrumentalities’ 
for the purposes of self-defence. This would be so, in the view of the EU 
Mission, because in such case peacekeeping operations are United Nations 
organs that act “under the overall control of the United Nations”.17 This 
conclusion, however, is not based on an adequate analysis of the legal status 
of military forces, such as the United Nations peacekeeping forces, which 
are composed of national contingents placed by their sending States at the 
disposal of an international organization.
3. The Legal status of national Contingents Put at the Disposal of an 
International Organization and its Implications for the Purposes 
of self-Defence
The view that the international organization has the sole international 
representation and responsibility for the activity of armed forces placed 
at its disposal by Member States finds some support in literature as well 
as in judicial decisions. With regard to the United Nations peacekeeping 
17) Ibid., p. 267.
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forces, this view has been sometimes premised on the fact that these forces 
are accorded the status of organs of the organization. For instance, in its 
decision in the Behrami and Saramati cases the European Court of Human 
Rights found it sufficient to refer to the status of UNMIK as “a subsidiary 
organ of the UN created under Chapter VII of the Charter” to justify 
its finding that the acts of UNMIK were attributable exclusively to the 
United Nations.18 Certain authors who hold the view that the international 
responsibility for the conduct of the United Nations peacekeeping forces 
is borne exclusively by the United Nations seem to rely on the argument 
that national contingents are placed under the exclusive authority of the 
organization.19
These arguments are scarcely tenable. The fact that the armed force 
of an organization is accorded the status of organ under the rules of that 
organization does not exclude national contingents from acting at the same 
time as organs of their respective States.20 Nor does it exclude that certain 
acts of a national contingent composing the force may be attributed to its 
sending State. As we shall see, what matters for the purposes of attribution 
is to establish which subject has authority over the contingent in relation 
to the specific acts under consideration. The view that national contingents 
are placed under the exclusive authority of the United Nations and cease to 
act as organs of their respective State does not reflect the way in which the 
transfer of powers over the troops is arranged between the United Nations 
and the contributing States. In fact, national contingents, while put at the 
disposal of the United Nations, continue to act simultaneously as organs 
18) Decision (Grand Chamber) of 2 May 2007, supra note 8, para. 141.
19) Seyersted, supra note 1, p. 429. It might be here observed that, in principle, when 
national contingents are fully seconded to an organization, that organization will no doubt 
be the only subject which can be regarded as bearing international rights and obligations in 
respect to the force. Moreover, in such a case all conduct of the force will be attributed to 
the organization.
20) The possibility that an individual or an entity, which has the status of organ of the lending 
State, is given the status of organ also within the internal legal order of the receiving State, 
“so that at a given moment he will formally be an organ of two different States at the same 
time”, was acknowledged by Ago. In respect to such a case, Ago observed that, “in spite of 
this formal situation, the person in question will in fact be acting only for one of the States 
or at all events in different conditions for each of them”. Roberto Ago, “Third Report on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission (1971) Vol. II-1, p. 268, note 401.
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of their respective States. This element has been duly highlighted by the 
International Law Commission in its commentary to Article 6 of the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. Referring to 
the situation in which “the lent organ or agent still acts to a certain extent 
as organ of the lending State”, the Commission noted that “[t]his occurs 
for instance in the case of military contingents that a State places at the 
disposal of the United Nations for a peacekeeping operation, since the State 
retains disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over the members of 
the national contingent”.21 In the Nissan case the same view was expressed 
by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in the following terms: “though national 
contingents were under the authority of the United Nations and subject 
to the instructions of the commander, the troops as members of the force 
remained in their national service. The British soldiers continued, therefore, 
to be soldiers of Her Majesty”.22 In fact, the retention of certain powers 
by the sending State implies that, as the United Nations Secretary-General 
put it, “United Nations command is not full command”.23 The authority 
of the United Nations over the forces is confined to operational command, 
while important command functions such as the exercise of disciplinary 
powers and criminal jurisdiction over the forces “remain the purview of 
their national authorities”.24
The fact that national contingents act simultaneously as organs of the 
organization and as organs of their respective States has important legal 
consequences. With regard to the question of international responsibility, 
the International Law Commission has clarified that in this type of situations 
attribution is based on the factual control over the conduct of the force.25 
This seems to imply that an act of the force is to be attributed either to the 
21) Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-first Session, supra note 3, p. 62.
22) Attorney-General v. Nissan, [1969] 1 All ER 629, p. 646.
23) Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their 
Aspects, Command and Control of United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, Report of the 
Secretary-General, 21 November 1994, A/49/681, p. 2. See also United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines (UN, 2008), p. 68, <www.peacekeepingbestpractices.
unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf>.
24) Comprehensive Review, supra note 23, p. 3.
25) Article 6 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 
adopted on first reading in 2009, provides that “[t]he conduct of an organ of a State or 
an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal of another 
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organization or to the sending State depending on whether that force, when 
taking that act, was acting under the control of the organization or of the 
State.26 According to some authors, however, dual attribution would better 
reflect the way in which, at least in the case of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, the power of control over the troops is distributed between the 
contributing States and the receiving organization. This would be so, in 
particular, because of the control retained by States over the operational 
employment of their troops.27
The fact that national contingents continue to act as organs of the sending 
States seems to have implications also with regard to the legal entitlement 
of the sending States to invoke rights in relation to the activity of their 
contingents. Some authors have argued that the right of States in situations of 
this type would essentially be confined to the right of diplomatic protection 
international organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter 
organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct”.
26) The commentary to Article 6 specifies that “[t]he criterion for attribution of conduct 
either to the contributing State or organization or to the receiving organization is based 
according to article 6 on the factual control that is exercised over the specific conduct taken 
by the organ or agent placed at the receiving organization’s disposal”. Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission, Sixty-first Session, supra note 3, p. 63. This view is also shared by 
several authors. See Moshe Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations toward 
Third Parties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995), p. 64 et seq.; Klein, supra note 
1, p. 379 et seq.; Michael Bothe and Thomas Dörchel, “UN Peacekeeping”, in Dieter Fleck 
(ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), p. 
502; Stefano Dorigo, “Imputazione e responsabilità internazionale per l’attività delle forze 
di peacekeeping delle Nazioni Unite”, 85 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2002), p. 903 et 
seq.; Marten Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004), p. 51 et seq. 
27) Luigi Condorelli, “Le statut des forces de l’ONU et le droit international humanitaire”, 
78 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1995), p. 893 et seq.; ID, “Conclusions générales”, in 
Mathias Forteau (ed.), La soumission des organisations internationales aux normes internationales 
relatives aux droits de l’homme (A. Pedone, Paris, 2009), p. 142; Christopher Leck, “Inter-
national Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Command and Control 
Arrangements and the Attribution of Conduct”, 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 
(2009), p. 1 et seq.; Tom Dannenbaum, “Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a 
System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should Be Apportioned for Violations of 
Human Rights by Member State Troops Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeep-
ers”, 51 Harvard International Law Journal (2010, forthcoming). On the question of whether 
the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations recognizes the possibility of dual attribution, see Pierre Bodeau-Livenec et al, 
“Note”, 102 American Journal of International Law (2008), p. 329. 
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in respect of nationals who are members of the armed force of the inter-
national organization.28 However, this view does not take into account the 
status of national contingents as organs of the sending States. If this element 
is adequately considered, then it may be held that in principle a sending 
State is entitled to invoke not only those rights based on the nationality of 
the injured individuals but also the rights based on the status of the troops 
as organs of that State.29
The latter aspect is most significant for the purposes of assessing whether 
a sending State may be entitled to use force in self-defence in cases of armed 
attack against its national contingent acting within the context of an opera-
tion established by an international organization. Should one accept that the 
right of protection belonging to the sending State is restricted to diplomatic 
protection in relation to injuries to its nationals, then the invocability of 
self-defence by that State would be ruled out. An attack against nationals 
abroad could hardly be regarded as an armed attack which triggers the right 
of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.30 It may be suggested that 
the use of force by the sending State could be justified on the ground of the 
need to rescue and protect nationals abroad. Indeed, in order to justify its 
military intervention in Georgia, the Russian Federation made also reference 
to the need to protect Russian citizens. As is well known, however, it is highly 
doubtful that, under general international law, the protection of nationals 
abroad can justify the use of force against another State. As it was observed 
by the EU Mission in this respect, “State practice and opinio iuris do not 
support a specific right to intervention in order to protect or rescue own 
nationals abroad as an independent legal title in itself ”.31
If, on the contrary, one recognizes that the right of protection belonging to 
the sending State goes beyond diplomatic protection as it also encompasses 
the entitlement to invoke those rights which are based on the status of the 
28) Seyersted, supra note 1, p. 429; Zwanenburg, supra note 26, p. 38.
29) Condorelli, “Le statut des forces de l’ONU”, supra note 27, p. 891.
30) For the view that “[u]nlike military units, neither diplomatic missions nor individual 
nationals are considered ‘external positions’ of a State that can be objects of an armed attack”, 
see Albrecht Randelzhofer, “Article 51”, in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd ed., 2002), p. 801. See also 
Roucounas, supra note 1, p. 91. For a different view see Antonio Cassese, “Article 51”, in Cot 
et al, supra note 1, p. 1350. 
31) Report, supra note 10, vol. II, p. 286.
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contingent as organ of the State, in principle the possibility that the sending 
State is entitled to invoke self-defence in response to an armed attack against 
its national contingent cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the permanence of an 
institutional link between the contingent and the sending State constitutes 
an element that lends some support to the proposition that, at least under 
certain circumstances, an armed attack against that contingent may be 
regarded as an attack against the State for the purposes of self-defence. In 
this respect, the fact that the international organization may be entitled to 
act in self-defence does not imply that the same right must be denied to 
the sending State. Referring to the problem of the “competition between 
the State’s right of diplomatic protection and the Organization’s right of 
functional protection”, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory 
opinion in the Reparation for Injuries case, acknowledged that, “[i]n such 
a case, there is no rule of law which assigns priority to the one or to the 
other, or which compels either the State or the Organization to refrain from 
bringing an international claim”.32 It may be held that the solution retained 
by the International Court of Justice with regard to that problem may be 
regarded as applying also to the situation at hand.33
4. Practice Concerning the Use of Force to Protect the Armed Forces 
of an International Organization
As far as this author is aware, practice does not offer examples in which 
a State invoked self-defence to justify resort to force in order to repel an 
armed attack against a military contingent put by that State at the disposal 
of an international organization. Here again, the lack of precedents is not 
surprising if one considers the limited number of international organizations 
having the competence to establish and deploy military forces. Moreover, 
as it will be shown, there seem to be other factors which may contribute to 
make this situation very unlikely to arise in practice.34
32) Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opionion, 
ICJ Reports 1949, p. 185. On the question of the relationship between the right of functional 
protection of an international organization and the right of diplomatic protection of the State 
of nationality of the injured agent, see John Dugard, Fifth Report on Diplomatic Protection, 
A/CN.4/538, p. 11 et seq.
33) Condorelli, “Le statut des forces de l’ONU”, supra note 27, p. 891 et seq.
34) Statements by States or international organizations claiming that sending States would be 
entitled to invoke self-defence in cases of an armed attack against their national contingents 
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When considering the different scenarios arising out of situations of 
military attack against peacekeeping forces, the United Nations, while con-
stantly recognizing that such forces are entitled to use force in self-defence,35 
has never contemplated the possibility of unilateral actions in self-defence 
by the sending States or by States acting on behalf of the sending States. 
Arguably, a strong reluctance to accept this possibility is to be expected from 
the United Nations. A unilateral use of force by the sending State would 
undermine the authority and control of the organization over the operation. 
It could also imperil the perception of the operation as one having strictly 
an international character and reflecting the will of the United Nations.36
On the other hand, there is little doubt that, particularly when a 
peacekeeping force is involved in a situation of military confrontation, the 
protection of national contingents represents a matter of major concern for 
States contributing troops to the organization. When situations of this kind 
had arisen, sending States did not fail to voice their concern by addressing 
protests or taking position against those responsible for the military attacks.37 
With regard to the type of action that sending States may take to protect 
their troops, a very far-reaching stance was taken by the United States in 
an official document issued in 1994, in the aftermath of the decision of that 
are also rare. See, however, the observation of Portugal according to which, when an inter-
national organization is administering a territory or deploying a military force, “the State 
whose forces were in territory or the individual members of those armed forces were the 
entities exercising self-defence”: A/C.6/61/SR.14, para. 74.
35) See, e.g., United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, supra note 23, p. 34. Admittedly, as 
noted supra note 1, when recognizing the existence of a right of self-defence in the context 
of peacekeeping operations, the United Nations generally employ that concept to refer to 
fact that in principle peacekeepers are entitled to resort to force to defend themselves or their 
mandate. This is also the meaning given to such term in the abovementioned document. 
36) On the importance for the United Nations of securing that a peacekeeping operation 
functions as one integrated unit reflecting the will of the international community as a whole, 
see Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations, supra note 23, 
p. 3, para. 7.
37) See, e.g., the statement issued at the end of the meeting convened in London on 21 July 
1995 by the foreign and defence ministers of the five-member Contact Group and 11 other 
main contributors to the United Nations peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia, where 
these States strongly condemned the armed attacks conducted by Bosnian Serbs against 
the United Nations’ ‘safe areas’, stressing that such attacks affected the national interests of 
troop-contributing States. See Maurice Torrelli, “Les zones de sécurité”, 106 Revue générale 
de droit international public (1995), p. 842, note 110. 
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State to withdraw its troops from the United Nations’ mission in Somalia. 
In this document, the government of the United States made it clear that, 
whenever forces of the United States will be placed under the operational 
control of a United Nations commander, certain “fundamental elements 
of U.S. command” would always apply.38 These elements would include, in 
particular, the “right” of the United States “to take whatever actions it deems 
necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered”. Although the United 
States government did not expressly refer to military actions to protect 
United States forces against an armed attack, this statement is broad enough 
that a reference to that situation appears to be implied. Certainly, when a 
State subjects its participation to a peacekeeping force to conditions such 
as those indicated by the United States in the abovementioned document, 
the organization could always decide to decline the offer by that State.39 Yet, 
independently of what would be the attitude of the receiving organization, 
the question to be asked here is whether, under the international rules on 
the use of force, the sending State would be entitled to resort to military 
force to protect a national contingent which is placed under the operational 
command and control of the organization.
Before turning to this issue, it may be interesting to note that, in situations 
in which United Nations peacekeeping forces were made the object of armed 
attacks, their protection has sometimes been given by States operating out-
side the United Nations command structure.40 In certain cases, the Security 
Council authorized States to conduct air strikes or other military actions 
to confront and deter the threat and use of armed force against United 
Nations forces. This is the case of Resolution 836 (1993), which, in addition 
to authorizing UNPROFOR, “acting in self-defence, to take the necessary 
measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the 
safe areas”, also authorized States to take, “under the authority of the Security 
38) “Key Elements of the Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace 
Operations”, 33 International Legal Materials (1994), p. 809.
39) See Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations, supra note 
23, p. 3, para. 7: “In some exceptional cases, troops have been offered with prior restrictions 
of a nature which would have severely compromised the contingents’ usefulness, and offers 
made on those conditions have had to be declined”.
40) See, e.g., Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Report of 
the Secretary-General, 20 September 1996, A/51/389, p. 6, paras 17–19.
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Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and 
UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, … to 
support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate”.41 While in this 
type of situation military intervention by States, insofar as it purports to 
respond to armed attacks against United Nations forces, comes close to an 
action in self-defence, it is clear that the legal basis for such use of force is 
to be found in the authorization by the Security Council.42 In this respect, 
an authorization by the Security Council may operate to a certain extent as 
an alternative legal basis for an armed intervention by States aimed at the 
protection of United Nations forces.43 It may be expected, at least in the 
context of the United Nations, that if the need arises for a military response 
to defend United Nations forces, an authorization to use force given by the 
Security Council would be the most suitable way to allow States to intervene.
5. The Intention of the Attacking state as a Criterion for 
Determining the existence of an Armed Attack against the troops-
Contributing state
Absent indications from practice, the invocability of self-defence by the 
sending State must be assessed primarily taking into account the rationale 
underlying the application of the rule of self-defence in case of an armed 
attack against the military forces of a State deployed abroad.
The fact that the use of force against certain State organs or installations 
abroad may amount to an armed attack triggering the right of self-defence 
is generally premised on the idea that these organs or installations constitute 
external manifestations of a State which, like State territory, enjoy protection 
41) Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, respectively para. 9 and para. 11 
of the operative part.
42) See in this respect the observations made by Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, “Le contrôle 
par le Conseil de sécurité des actes de légitime défense”, in Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des 
Nations Unies (Paris, 1995), p. 94. 
43) In fact, if the Security Council authorizes States to use force to defend a peacekeeping 
force which is made the object of an armed attack, such measure would have the effect of 
terminating the possibility of invoking self-defence. Under Article 51 of the Charter, the 
right of self-defence continues “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security”. No doubt, an authorization to use force 
constitutes a measure terminating the right of self-defence within the meaning of Article 51.
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in relation to the prohibition to use force.44 Armed forces are certainly 
included among such external manifestations of the State. Thus, an armed 
attack against military units of the State operating abroad is equivalent, for 
the purposes of self-defence, to an attack against State territory.
Moving from this premise, it seems that when a military unit of a 
State is placed at the disposal of an organization and is deployed abroad 
within the context of a military mission established by that organization, 
the identification of such unit as an external manifestation of the State 
is questionable. It is true that national contingents, to a certain extent, 
continue to act as organs of their respective States. However, this element, 
in itself, can hardly be considered as decisive as it is counterbalanced by 
the fact that these contingents also act as an organ of the organization. In 
many respects, since for the duration of their participation to the military 
operation national contingents act in the discharge of functions assigned to 
them by the organization and under its operational command and control, 
the elements linking national contingents to the organization appear to be 
preponderant. Under these circumstances, it seems difficult to admit that 
the use of force against a national contingent can be readily equated to an 
armed attack against the sending State. This is the more so since in most cases 
such use of force will be mainly motivated by the intention of the attacking 
State to prevent troops from discharging their functions under the mandate 
assigned to them by the organization. In this kind of situation, while the 
international organization can certainly be considered to be a victim of 
armed attack triggering its right of self-defence, the same does not necessarily 
hold true for the sending State. In the absence of circumstances indicating 
that the use of force was specifically aimed at targeting the sending State 
an important element for considering that State as a victim of an armed 
attack seems to be lacking.
A different conclusion may be advocated if, on the contrary, the attacking 
State uses force against a national contingent specifically in order to target 
the sending State. This intention of the attacking State, coupled with the 
fact that the attacked military unit retains the status of an organ of the 
44) See Randelzhofer, supra note 30, para. 24; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 3rd ed., 2001), p. 177; Olivier Corten, Le droit 
contre la guerre (A. Pedone, Paris, 2008), p. 614; Roucounas, supra note 1, p. 91; Chatham 
House, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence, p. 5, <www.
chathamhouse.org.uk>.
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sending State, may justify the recognition for the latter State of a right to 
protect its contingent. In particular, it may be argued that since the military 
contingent was attacked because it represented the sending State, that State 
may be regarded as being the victim of an armed attack triggering the right 
of self-defence.
Thus, the intention of the attacking State seems to play a major role in 
assessing whether a sending State may be considered as entitled to act in 
self-defence in the case of an armed attack against a military unit which 
that State had placed at the disposal of an international organization. The 
importance of this element as a criterion for determining whether an action 
involving the use of force amounts to an armed attack finds support in 
practice.45 Most prominently, in its judgment in the Oil Platforms case, the 
International Court of Justice held the view that a missile attack against 
a US-flagged vessel, allegedly carried out by Iran at a time in which that 
State was at war with Iraq, could not amount to an armed attack because 
there was no evidence that such vessel was specifically targeted;46 similarly it 
excluded that the mining of another US-flagged vessel could be considered 
as an armed attack since it had not been established that “the mine struck 
by the Bridgeton was laid with the specific intention of harming that ship, 
or other United States vessels”.47 Interpreting the Court’s dictum in the 
light of the particular context in which the attacks against the United States 
vessels took place, the EU Fact-Finding Mission in Georgia observed that 
“the requirement of a specific intention to target the state which claims 
self-defence is especially important if the asserted attack occurs, as here, in 
a military conflict between two other parties”.48 Along the same line it could 
be held that the requirement of a specific intention to target the State plays 
45) For an examination of the pertinent practice, see, in particular, Corten, supra note 44, 
p. 100 et seq. On the relevance of the intention of the attacking State for the purposes of 
determining whether certain conduct involving the use of force may be qualified as an armed 
attack, see also Roucounas, supra note 1, p. 110; Chatham House, supra note 44, p. 6.
46) Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1993, p. 
191, para. 64.
47) Ibid.
48) Report, supra nota 10, vol. II, p. 266. Similarly, referring to the Court’s statement, 
Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
3rd ed., 2008), p. 145, observed that “the Court apparently decided that harm by a mine or 
a missile constitutes an armed attack on a third State during a conflict between two other 
States only if the attack was specifically aimed at that third State”.
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a crucial role in situations in which, given the complex legal status of the 
armed forces which have been made the object of the armed attack, it is 
not clear whether these forces were attacked because of the functions they 
performed under the command and control of the organization or because 
they represented the State at which the attack was aimed. In the latter case 
the sending State may be regarded as being a victim of an armed attack 
triggering the right of self-defence.
While the attacking State’s intention appears to constitute the decisive 
criterion by which to assess the existence of the sending State’s right to act 
in self-defence, it may be asked whether other situations may be envisaged 
in which the sending State would be entitled to use force to defend its 
national contingent. In particular, the question could be raised of whether, 
if the international organization fails to take any action in response to the 
military attack, the sending State could then be considered to be entitled to 
use force. There is certainly some merit in the idea that sending States would 
retain some sort of residual right of self-defence in case of inaction of the 
organization. This would result in a mechanism that gives the organization 
the possibility to first assert its right to act in self-defence while at the same 
time avoiding the risk that, because of the organization’s inaction, no military 
protection may be provided to the forces which have been made the object 
of the armed attack. While this mechanism has clear practical advantages, 
it is difficult to see on which legal basis the existence of such a residual right 
of self-defence can be premised. Lacking any element of practice, it seems 
that this argument could only be regarded as de lege ferenda.49
49) It is interesting to note that, when considering the problem of the relationship between an 
international organization’s right of functional protection in respect to its agents and a State’s 
right of diplomatic protection in respect of a national who is an agent of the organization, 
the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, John 
Dugard, had considered the possibility to include in the draft articles a provision which 
gave priority to the organization’s functional protection while recognizing the possibility for 
States to exercise their right of diplomatic protection “where that organization is unable or 
unwilling to exercise functional protection”. See Dugard, supra note 32, p. 11. In Dugard’s 
view, this rule would introduce a “helpful method of reconciling competing claims” (at p. 
17). He acknowledged, however, that there was no support for the principle of priority in 
international practice. The final text of the draft articles adopted by the International Law 
Commission in 2006 does not address the question of the protection of an agent of an 
international organization.
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6. Conclusions
Together with the question of the invocability of self-defence by an inter-
national organization, it may well be that also the question of the invocability 
of self-defence by the sending State of a military unit placed at the disposal 
of an international organization is destined to remain a theoretical issue. This 
notwithstanding, the question is one worth exploring, particularly because 
it contributes to shed some light on the complexity of the relationship 
existing between the sending State and the organization in the case in which 
a national contingent is not fully seconded to the organization.
The fact that, contrary to the view that is sometimes expressed, national 
contingents, while integrated in a force that acts as organ of the organization, 
also act as organs of their respective States raises a number of interesting 
questions. In recent years, the International Law Commission has attempted 
to clarify how responsibility for wrongful acts of these forces must be ap-
portioned between the sending State and the receiving organization. Other 
problems have not yet received a comparable attention and are the subject 
of considerable legal uncertainty. This remark applies, in particular, to the 
question of determining which rights, if any, a State may be entitled to 
claim in relation to the activity of one of its organs which has been placed 
at the disposal of an international organization, and what is the relation-
ship between the position of the sending State and that of the receiving 
organization in respect to the protection of rights arising in connection with 
the activity of the lent organ.
Without purporting to give an answer to the foregoing general questions, 
the present study constitutes an attempt to offer some elements for assessing 
the implications deriving from a military contingent’s dual status as both 
the State’s and the organization’s organ with regard to the question of the 
allocation of the right of self-defence. The suggested solution, which is based 
on the consideration of both the contingent’s dual status and the rationale 
underlying the rule on self-defence, does not exclude the possibility for the 
sending State to invoke self-defence nor does it recognize for that State an 
unfettered right to intervene in self-defence whenever the national contin-
gent is made the object of an armed attack. By admitting the invocability 
of self-defence by the State only in those cases in which the armed attack is 
clearly aimed at targeting that State, this solution seems to strike a reasonable 
balance between the interest of the international organization in preserving 
its autonomy in the direction of the military operations and the interest of 
the State to intervene whenever the attack put its security at risk.
